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INTRODUCTION
The clich6 about introducing evidence in arbitration is that
there are no rules of evidence that apply, but arbitrators may take
submitted evidence for what it is worth.1 This notion of how
evidentiary rules operates in arbitration is linked to principles-that
the discovery phase of arbitration is intended to be efficient,
proportional to the size of the dispute and complexity of issues
presented and, ultimately, limited in scope.2 Under many arbitration
* Professor Radvany is a Clinical Professor at Fordham Law School, where he
directs the Securities Arbitration Clinic and teaches Trial and Arbitration Advocacy.
He would like to thank Professor James Kainen for his very helpful input for this
paper and my research assistant, William Bergesch, for his exceptional work.
1. Bruce A. McAllister & Amy Bloom, Evidence In Arbitration, 34 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 35, 53 (2003).
2. See generally Paul Radvany, Recent Trends In Discovery In Arbitration And
In The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, 34 REV. LrrIG. 705 (2015)_(contrasting
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rule regimes, discovery is written to be fairly limited; yet after the
discovery phase is concluded, there are few if any procedural
safeguards against the subsequent admissibility of material
discovered. Many arbitrators admit almost anything proffered as
evidence, and these decisions are largely beyond review.3
Broadly speaking, however, this is a reversal of how
discoverability and evidentiary admissibility work in civil litigation.
In civil litigation, the discovery phase is intended to be broad, while
the admission of evidence at trial is highly regulated, requiring
evidence to be not only relevant,4 but also reliable and not unfairly
prejudicial. 5 Furthermore, many other rules of evidence-such as the
hearsay doctrine, the rules surrounding experts and opinions, and
requirements such as authentication and personal knowledge-serve
to promote other important purposes simply not considered by the
rules governing discovery. Evidence law serves as a procedural
safeguard to limit the ultimate admissibility of material discovered. 6 It
does this by balancing the discovery regime's initial desire to provide
parties with the best opportunity to uncover information with a later
set of hurdles, which ultimately promotes the resolution of cases on
the most reliable information available.7
This article will examine the dichotomy between discovery
and evidentiary admissibility in civil litigation and arbitration. It will
suggest that, contrary to the idea that principles of evidence have no
role to play in arbitration, those principles may in fact be important
both for counsel to argue and for arbitrators to consider, regardless of
whether or not evidence proffered will ultimately be admitted. This is
because evidence law was created for the purpose of weighing the
reliability of evidence and articulating how a certain piece of evidence
may or may not be used. The attorney prepared to make evidentiary
the philosophy of broad discovery, the upcoming revisions to discovery in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the intent for more limited discovery under
the rules for various arbitration regimes).
3. See discussion infra Part LI.a.
4. FED. R. EvmD. 401. The term "relevance" is encountered both in discussion
of civil discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as in evidence
law, as described by the Federal Rules of Evidence. As will be discussed further, the
term has differing meanings in the two settings. However, it is useful to point out
that the scope of "relevant" material in the discovery sphere has undergone recent
changes, with the enacting of the 2015 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Radvany, supra note 2, at Part II.C. 1.
5. FED. R. EviD. 403.
6. See discussion infra Part I (discussing FED R. Civ. P. 26 and the scope of
"relevance" in discovery).
7. See infra Part I (explaining the reasons particular forms of evidence or
testimony are excluded).
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arguments on issues raised by a proffered piece of evidence-despite
the fact that in arbitration, the evidence will likely be admitted-is in
the better position to control how much weight the arbitrator gives that
evidence.8 Thus, if inadmissible evidence may be admitted by an
arbitrator "for what it's worth," it can be helpful if attorneys
representing clients in arbitration are able to explain why that evidence
would be otherwise inadmissible under the rules of evidence at trial.
This explanation can be given in the form of an objection to the offered
evidence or strategically placed within that attorney's closing
argument.
Part I of this paper will outline the theory of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, focusing on the idea that proffered evidence must satisfy
certain qualifications to be admitted or be excluded as unreliable for
one of several reasons. Part II will compare various arbitral rule
regimes, showing how they largely do not lay out a framework for
admission or exclusion of evidence. Rather, arbitrators may admit
whatever they wish-with the expectation that they will give the
evidence whatever weight they deem to be appropriate-provided that
the evidence is relevant and material. Part II will also discuss the
latitude that arbitrators have to admit or not admit evidence. Part HI
will discuss how arbitrators are affected by evidence that might be
excluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and whether or not
there are still reasons counsel might be interested in presenting
evidence based arguments during arbitration.
I. THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE RULES
This section will outline the overall philosophy of, and some
specific rules found within, the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"). I
begin by contrasting the FRE's constraints on admission of evidence
discovered, with the relatively broad and unconstrained nature of the
prior discovery phase itself. Thus, having provided for relatively broad
access to material through discovery, the structured approach to
evidentiary admissibility seeks to promote the resolution of the dispute
8. In contrast, some commentators have suggested that certain factors have
developed the arbitral forum beyond being simply a venue where evidence rules are
relaxed, and that arbitration has instead become, for some lawyers, a refuge the
primary advantage of which is that evidence rules are rarely consciously
acknowledged, and in many cases openly ignored. See discussion infra Part II
(discussing the overall decline of jury trials, the relative litigation inexperience of
present day litigators, the perception of evidence law as a discrete subject within the
legal community, and the strengths and weaknesses of individual arbitrators).
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on the more, rather than less, reliable forms of the information
discovered. 9
The FRE are comprised of eleven articles, which collectively
regulate what documents, testimony, or physical evidence may be
presented to the fact finder and how that presentation must occur.
10
The common-law evidence tradition underpinning the FRE -
particularly the doctrine of hearsay--established certain policies about
which forms of evidence are more reliable, less reliable, or whose
reliability are contingent on other factors.11 In general, the FRE require
evidence to be authenticated on the record, 12 relevant to the merits of
the legal dispute itself or the bias or credibility of witnesses,1 3 not
unfairly prejudicial,14 and not derived from inadmissible hearsay. 15 A
person must generally proffer testimony with personal knowledge
about that which they are testifying.1 6 Speculation and opinion by lay
witnesses is generally prohibited. 17 However, subject to proper
qualification, "expert" witnesses may be proffered and subsequently
provide opinion testimony based upon their area of expertise to assist
the trier of fact in situations where such knowledge is necessary to
understand or determine a fact at issue.1 8
9. See generally FED. R. EvID. 401, 402, 807; see also Tamara F. Lawson, Can
Fingerprints Lie?: Re-Weighing Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 14 (2003) (characterizing FRE 401 and 402 as establishing a
generalized "requirement of the Federal Rules of Evidence that only relevant and
reliable evidence be admitted").
10. For a review of this, see PETER MURPHY, MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 18-19
(6th ed. 1996) ("Evidence is said to be admissible, or receivable, if it may be received
by the court for the purpose of proving facts, when judged by the law of evidence.").
11. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The
Importance of Complexity, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 367, 370 (1991-1992) (discussing the
principle that hearsay is considered less reliable than live testimony because live
testimony is subject to trial safeguards that help the fact finder evaluate its
trustworthiness and necessity).
12. FED. R. EVED. art. IX.
13. FED. R. EviD. art. IV.
14. FED. R. EviD. 403.
15. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII.
16. FED. R. EVID. 602.
17. FED. R. EvID. 701; see also Joseph Richard Ward III, The Interpretation of
Context: How Some Federal Circuits Are Bypassing the Familiar Requirement of
Firsthand Knowledge for Lay Witnesses, 15 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L 117, 120 (2013)
("Rule 701 limits lay opinion testimony to those opinions or inferences that are
rationally based on the perception of the witness, helpful to a clear understanding of
the witness's testimony, and not based on the type of specialized knowledge reserved
for expert witnesses in Rule 702").
18. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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The role of evidence law is relatively narrow; thus, the FRE
identify only certain narrow, nuanced issues pertaining to specific
pieces of evidence or testimony. Similarly, the FRE contemplate the
exclusion of the evidence based upon those limited issues. Other
phases of the American litigation process occurring prior to trial
provide differing features and safeguards that ensure parties will have
all material to which they are entitled to attempt admitting as
evidence. 19 Specifically, the civil discovery process functions in a
broad fashion, without reference to whether material discovered may
ultimately be admissible at trial.
Civil discovery exists to give parties the opportunity to acquire
the information necessary to substantiate the claims or defenses that
comprise their case. The discovery phase of litigation, governed by
rules found within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is
substantively over-inclusive, revealing to the parties more information
than may ultimately be admissible. The 2015 Advisory Committee
note to the newly revised Rule 26 states that "[i]nformation is
discoverable under revised Rule 26(b)(1) if it is relevant to any party's
claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case" but does
not reference evidentiary admissibility.20
The purpose of this rule is to give parties the best opportunity
to discover the underlying facts and to construct the strongest, most
complete case possible; the law of evidence resolves the evidence's
admissibility at a later stage in the litigation process. 21 The rules thus
establish a far-reaching ability to discover evidence that may not be
admissible at trial. This is preferable because while lawyers are
building their cases, it is unclear which facts they may be able to
present at trial. Information made known to parties through
discovery-even from inadmissible evidence-allows parties to seek
out admissible evidence to show those facts.2 2
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (providing various requirements governing
disclosure during the discovery phase).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 26; see Radvany, supra note 2, at 712 (indicating the
particular changes made).
21. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947) (stating that the rules
of discovery are to be accorded "broad and liberal treatment," because "[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation"); see also S.E.C. v. Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
(recently applying and repeatedly citing to Hickman in context of securities
litigation-related discovery issues).
22. In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009)
(allowing discovery of information on a different model of tires than the model at
issue in the case on the basis that it "could tend to lead to discoverable evidence").
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Ultimately, the discovery/admissibility rule structure errs on
the side of allowing parties to discover information that may not be
admissible, rather than potentially preventing them from even
knowing of the existence of such information. 23 Discovery takes place
at a phase in the litigation process in which parties are both identifying
issues and assessing the scope of those issues.24 Thus, it is impossible
to make even a threshold determination of what will ultimately be
"relevant" in the evidentiary sense at a future trial on the merits.
Therefore, the standard for "relevance" during the discovery phase
must be broader, both (1) to accomplish the different purpose of the
discovery phase of litigation, and (2) to prevent discovery from
devolving into a premature trial-within-a-trial on the merits,
particularly at a time when the scope of the factual inquiry is still
developing.
During the discovery phase, for example, a witness may
usually be deposed and asked about any relevant, non-privileged
matter, although counsel may reach other agreements between
themselves that limit the scope of a particular deposition.25 The
witness's answer at the deposition may implicate hearsay concerns,
reveal a prior bad act, or cause the witness to conjecture or speculate.
23. However, the most recent changes to FED. R. Civ. P. 26 did make certain
changes to the "proportionality" requirement, although it remains to be seen how
they will affect discovery in practice. See Radvany, supra note 2, at 737-38
(considering the outcomes that could result from these changes to Rule 26).
24. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)
("Consistently with the notice-pleading system established by the Rules, discovery
is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to
help define and clarify the issues .... Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case,
for a variety of fact-oriented issues may arise during litigation that are not related to
the merits.") (citing Hickman) (internal citations omitted).
25. See, e.g., In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 619 (D. Nev.
1998) ("A party may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to
preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to
present a motion") (emphasis added) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1)); Rohrbough v.
Harris, 549 F.3d 1313, 1329 (10th Cir. 2008) (Lucero, J., dissenting) (stating that
the purpose of FED. R. Civ. P. 30 is to allow parties to be "safe in the knowledge that
objectionable [deposition] questions and answers would not be admitted at trial.").
See also Eric B. Miller, Lawyers Gone Wild. Are Depositions Still A "Civil"
Procedure?, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1527, 1536 (2010) ("Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, objections to the form of the question are proper if the question is:
1. Leading or suggestive; 2. Ambiguous or uncertain; 3. Compound; 4. Assum[ing]
facts not in evidence; 5. Call[ing] for a narration; 6. Call[ing] for speculation or
conjecture; or 7. Argumentative.") (internal marks omitted). See generally E.
Stewart Moritz, The Lawyer Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks: Reconsidering the
Contemporaneous Objection Requirement in Depositions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1353,
1365-74 (2004) (discussing the history of objections during depositions).
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At trial, that same witness would be prohibited from providing the
same testimony by the FRE, because the rules reflect a policy that
evidence of that sort proffered in such a way is unreliable for the trier
of fact or could taint their ability to reach a decision on the merits.
During the discovery phase, however, such objections are prohibited
at deposition because the witness's answer might, as discussed above,
provide a party with the knowledge to derive admissible evidence
establishing what the witness testified to, but from another admissible
source. 6 Additionally, witness testimony given free from evidentiary
objection gives the party questioning the witness the ability to delve
into other avenues of inquiry which may subsequently establish that
something to which the witness testified but which appeared
inadmissible is actually admissible, but for a reason that is not
immediately apparent.27
A second presumption that helps frame the policies of the FRE
is the idea that the judge who rules on the admissibility of a piece of
evidence is separate from the fact finder, and performs a "gatekeeper"
function.28 The reason the judge must exclude unreliable and unduly
prejudicial evidence from the fact finder is because the fact finder
cannot be trusted to accurately gauge reliability or may be prejudiced,
and thus might be led astray; but at the same time, the reason the trier
of fact, and not the judge, is intended to determine the ultimate
outcome is because they have not been exposed to the unreliable
evidence at all.29
26. Although some objections are permitted during depositions and may be
argued in front of a Magistrate Judge, counsel attempting to object to clearly relevant
non-privileged testimony run the risk of sanctions. See First Tennessee Bank v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 108 F.R.D. 640, 640 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) ("It is well-settled that
counsel should never instruct a witness not to answer a question during a deposition
unless the question seeks privileged information or unless counsel wishes to adjourn
the deposition for the purpose of seeking a protective order from what he or she
believes is annoying, embarrassing, oppressive or bad faith conduct by adverse
counsel.").
27. Several of the Federal Rules of Evidence, discussed later, provide that
evidence may be inadmissible for one purpose, yet admissible for another; however,
the proponent of the evidence has the burden to articulate his or her proffered
admissible purpose once an objection has been made. See infra Part IA, C
(discussing FRE 404, 801, 803, 804).
28. The "gatekeeper" is most specifically spoken of in the context of the
judge's responsibility to prevent the jury from seeing unreliable expert evidence.
See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the
Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv 217,
221 (2006) (characterizing the case of expert testimony as being subject to a "strong"
judicial gatekeeper function).
29. See Kathryn Cameron Walton, An Exercise in Sound Discretion: Old Chief
v. United States, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1053, 1080-81 (1998) ("[I]n the context of Rule
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A. Relevance
The most fundamental substantive requirement for evidence to
be admissible is that it be relevant.3" Relevant evidence is any
evidence that "has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.- 31 However, not all of the
Article IV rules that discuss relevance are intrinsically concerned with
the reliability or unreliability of evidence. 32 In many cases, the various
Article IV exclusionary rules represent policy-based determinations
about how certain evidence is likely to be perceived or used by
jurors.33 The exclusionary rationale of these rules presumes that the
403, prejudice may not merely refer to an appeal to emotion. Rather, prejudice may
occur when facts cause the jurors to base their decision on feelings, such as hostility
or sympathy, and to disregard the probative worth of the evidence presented.").
Compare Madelyn Chortek, The Psychology of Unknowing: Inadmissible Evidence
in Jury and Bench Trials, 32 REv. L1TIG. 117, 123-25 (2013) (discussing "Ironic
Mental Processes" and "Mental Contamination" as reasons to separate the function
of the judge from the function of the jury), with Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions,
95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1451-52 (2007) (describing the "presumption that jurors can
understand and follow limiting instructions" as "plainly... a new legal fiction").
30. See David A. Schlueter, Evidence, 22 TEX. TECH L. REv. 573, 578 (1991)
(characterizing relevance as "[t]he minimum threshold for any offered item of
evidence").
31. FED. R. EviD. 401(a).
32. See 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FED. EviD. § 403:1 (7th ed.)
("Evidence which meets the standard of relevancy, Rule 401, may nevertheless
possess attendant disadvantages of sufficient importance to call for its exclusion.").
There is some disagreement amongst academics, however, about how to interpret
the framework of a general rule of relevancy, and its subsequent modifications,
limitations, and exclusions. Compare Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1522 (1999) (arguing that the
cumulative impact of Rules 401-403 works to "make economic sense") with Richard
Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA.
L. REv. 1619, 1677-78 (2001) (arguing that contrary to pure economic sense, Rule
403 is designed to be "tilted towards admissibility," and that the "substantially
outweighed" language "indicates that the drafters were not thinking in purely cost-
benefit, much less economic, terms").
33. There is a distinction between rules that foster "epistemic" versus
"extrinsic" goals in evidence law, the latter most classically showcased by rules such
as the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures, liability insurance, or offers made
in settlement negotiations. The "extrinsic" policies underlying such rules-that they
"are designed to create the proper incentives for socially desirable out-of-court
conduct"-are, in these cases, given priority above the epistemic goal of providing
the finder of fact with as much relevant information as possible. Frederick Schauer,
On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 167-
68 (2006) (characterizing various policy-based rules of evidence as seeking
"extrinsic" goals, designed to "create incentives for socially desirable out-of-court
476 [Vol. 36:3
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process as a whole may benefit from exclusion of such evidence,
despite that evidence being relevant (at least in part).34
Rule 403 excludes evidence that is relevant but substantially
more prejudicial than probative, because of the danger that the fact
finder will be unduly influenced by the inflammatory nature of the
evidence, relative to whatever the actual relevant purpose of the
evidence may be. 35 Evidence may also be excluded for reasons other
than the inflammatory nature of the material,36 but the rule is most
classically invoked in the context of material or testimony which has
"an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one," such as "bias,
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." 37 That said, the
fact that the standard for exclusion is "substantially more" prejudicial
than probative means that this rule still favors admissibility of relevant
evidence, with judges conducting Rule 403 balancing tests in favor of
the proponent of the evidence.38
Rule 404 excludes character evidence, i.e. evidence that
attempts to prove that a party acted in a certain way on a certain
occasion, based on the party's actions on previous occasions, or based
on a party's personality or tendency to act in a relevant way.3 9 Rule
conduct" as the "exception," in comparison to most of the exclusionary rules aimed
at "increasing the accuracy and efficiency of fact finding").
34. Id.
35. See United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Its major
finction is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force,
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. As to such, Rule 403 is
meant to relax the iron rule of relevance, to permit the trial judge to preserve the
fairness of the proceedings by exclusion despite its relevance."). See also 2 MICHAEL
H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 403:1 (7th ed.).
36. See 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, § 403:1 (discussing "confus[ion of] the issues,
misleading the jury, and considerations of undue delay, wasting time and needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence").
37. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the
Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 503 (1983)
("Current case law considers 'emotion' the hallmark of unfair prejudice."); 2
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FED. EvID. § 403:1 (7th ed.); see also
Brandom v. United States, 431 F.2d 1391, 1398 (7th Cir. 1970) ("Inflammatory,
irrelevant evidence is improper and inadmissible. Under appropriate circumstances,
its admission may constitute reversible error.").
38. See United States v. Morris, 79 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Because
Rule 403 requires the exclusion of relevant evidence, it is an extraordinary measure
that should be used sparingly."); see also 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 6.02(1) (2017) ("The trial court should
strike the balance in favor of admission in most cases.)
39. FED. R. EviD. 404. The psychological consistency of the use of character
traits has been under debate for some time, with scholars broadly acknowledging
some basis upon which to measure future conduct, but disagreeing on how to apply
Symposium 2016]
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404-which codifies long-standing common law practice of excluding
character evidence-stems from a traditional acknowledgment that
there may be some marginal relevance to a person's propensity to act
a certain way, but excludes evidence that is susceptible to that chain
of inference alone.4° This is because character evidence by definition
does not serve as direct evidence of the specific act with which a given
defendant is charged with, and it raises a substantial danger of
prejudice. 4 ' A decision made on such a calculus falls quite short of the
standards desired in legal decision making, despite the fact that
character evidence is acknowledged to be, on some level, "relevant"
under the rules.42
any objective measurement apparatus to determine consistency. See generally David
P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in
the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1987) (outlining various
research approaches through the 20th century).
40. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("The State
may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill
name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive
that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime ... [t]he overriding
policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the
practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair
surprise and undue prejudice" (emphasis added)).
41. Some have suggested that the danger of the jury simply inferring that,
because of prior bad acts, the defendant is a "bad man" is in fact more severe than
the drawing of a direct propensity inference. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of
Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58
WASH. L. REV. 497, 525 (1983) ("[The greatest danger] is that [the jury members]
will convict because their conclusion that defendant is a 'bad person' leads them to
draw inferences concerning his likely conduct that are not reasonable or are believed
with an unreasonable degree of certainty."); see also Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469, 489 (1948) ("The common law has not grown in the tradition of
convicting a man and sending him to prison because he is generally a bad man or
generally regarded as one. General bad character, much less general bad reputation,
has not yet become a criminal offense in our scheme. Our whole tradition is that a
man can be punished by criminal sanctions only for specific acts defined beforehand
to be criminal, not for general misconduct or bearing a reputation for such
misconduct."); United States v. Avarello, 592 F.2d 1339, 1346 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The
danger inherent in evidence of prior convictions is that juries may convict a
defendant because he is a 'bad man' rather than because evidence of the crime of
which he is charged has proved him guilty.").
42. See Jones v. Southern Pacific R.R., 962 F.2d 447,449 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The
reason for the rule is that such character evidence is of slight probative value and
tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened
on a particular occasion."). The specific and long-standing mistrust of fact finders
giving rise to this rule is such that the rule against "circumstantial" use of character
evidence "is so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost
constitutional proportions and to override doubts of the basic relevancy of the
evidence." See FED. R. EVrD. 404, 1974 Advisory Committee Note (discussing
[Vol. 36:3478
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Rule 407 prohibits introduction of evidence that after an injury
occurred, "subsequent remedial measures" were taken that would
perhaps have made the initial injury less likely to occur, for a number
of reasons. 43 Despite the fact that evidence of these measures would
arguably tend to suggest some consciousness of guilt or the existence
of danger,4 the FRE opt to exclude such evidence based on a policy
that if evidence of remedial measures was admissible, there would be
a disincentive to fix potentially dangerous situations post-injury.45
Further, evidence of taking subsequent measures to make something
safer is not necessarily probative of whether or not the prior state was
so unsafe as to be grounds for legal liability; the classic standard for
negligence being reasonable-rather than elevated-care, based on
the information or technology available at the time of manufacture.4 6
criminal cases specifically, but also acknowledging that circumstantial use is also
prohibited in civil actions). Despite the Advisory Committee's acknowledgement of
"basic relevancy," commentators still disagree about the actual basis of excluding
character evidence. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct:
Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 30-31
(1987) (contrasting whether character evidence is "logically irrelevant," of "little,"
or of "no probative value.").
43. FED. R. EvID. 407.
44. See David A. Schlueter, Evidence, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 573, 587-88
(1991) ('The logical relevance of a subsequent repair is that it may amount to an
admission of fault by the responsible party"). But, to the degree that such evidence
cannot be admitted, courts have explained that even if admitted, such evidence
would have relatively low weight. Compare In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498,
529 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing how Rule 407 excludes a class of evidence which is
"very poor proof of negligence or defectiveness") with Rimkus v. Nw. Colorado Ski
Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating as an example that some
conduct "would also be consistent with an injury due to contributory negligence").
45. See Rimkus, 706 F.2d at 1064 ("One of the general policies behind Rule
407 is that it encourages desirable repairs"); see also FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory
committee's note to 1972 proposed rules ("[The more impressive] ground for
exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety."). In this way,
Rule 407 provides the classic case of a rule of evidence concerned primarily with
promoting a substantive policy goal, specifically, public safety. See David P.
Leonard, Rules of Evidence and Substantive Policy, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 797, 803
(1992) (using the rule as the example of one that "has an intended positive effect on
the important substantive policy of accident deduction but at some loss to the goal
of accurate adjudication"); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1531 (1999) (framing the rationale for
Rule 407 economically and concluding that the benefits of encouraging repairs
surpass the future evidentiary cost of exclusion).
46. See Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888
(5th Cir. 1983) ("The jury's attention should be directed to whether the product was
reasonably safe at the time it was manufactured"); see also Columbia & P. S. R. Co.
v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892) (explaining the rationale by reference to
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Rule 408 excludes from relevancy any mention of compromise
offers, settlement discussions, and statements made in negotiation.47
Although such statements could tend to show acknowledgement of
liability, the Advisory Committee specifically acknowledges that a
desire to settle may well be motivated by ancillary concerns, rather
than admission of fault, in which case evidence of the settlement offer
would be irrelevant.48 Moreover, a strong public policy seeking
efficiency in the settlement of disputes is encouraged by Rule 408's
protection of such discussions.49 Somewhat similarly, Rule 411
excludes mention of whether a party carries insurance, 50 on the basis
that a fact finder with knowledge that a party either (a) carries
insurance, which would be obligated to pay any liability ultimately
found, or (b) was injured, but has already been compensated by
insurance yet is still seeking additional damages may be influenced by
that knowledge.5' Moreover, like with the making of subsequent
changes under Rule 407 and the offering of settlement under Rule 408,
courts have made the point that part of the rationale of Rule 411 is that
the mere carrying of insurance is not direct proof of liability. 52
older English case law, which criticized the logic that "because the world gets wiser
as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before") (citing Hart v. Lancashire &
Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. N.S. 261, 263 (1869)).
47. FED. R. EviD. 408.
48. See Sternberger v. United States, 401 F.2d 1012, 1018 (Ct. Cl. 1968) ("An
offer in settlement is ordinarily not admissible, for it is deemed to be an indication
only of a desire for peace and not an admission.").
49. FED. R. EvrD. 408 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules. See
also Perzinski v. Chevron Chemical Co., 503 F.2d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he
law favors settlements of controversies and if an offer of a dollar amount by way of
compromise were to be taken as an admission of liability, voluntary efforts at
settlement would be chilled."); Olin Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America,
603 F. Supp. 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y.) on reargument, 607 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("The purpose of the rule is to encourage full and frank disclosure between
the parties in order to promote settlements rather than protracted litigation.").
50. FED. R. EviD. 411.
51. See e.g., LaMade v. Wilson, 512 F.2d 1348, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
("[A]dmission of evidence concerning an injured party's receipt of collateral social
insurance benefits constitutes reversible error, because it involves a substantial
likelihood of prejudicial impact and the possibility of its misuse by the jury
outweighs its probative value."); Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d
751, 758 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Knowledge that a party is insured may also affect a verdict
if the jury knows that some of the loss has been paid by insurance or that it would
satisfy a judgment against a defendant.").
52. See Cox v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 38 F.R.D. 8, 9 (W.D.S.C.
1965) (existence of liability insurance "can throw no light on the question of
negligence or other circumstances of the accident").
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B. Hearsay
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement being offered in court to
prove the truth of whatever the statement asserts.53 Hearsay most
classically occurs when somebody is testifying in court for the purpose
of establishing a fact which they know only based upon some other
person relating that fact to them;54 however, the doctrine expands to
far more than mere oral testimony.55 The reason it is desirable to
exclude hearsay is because when a situation such as this occurs, it is
impossible to go beyond taking the word of the original speaker for
the fact of whatever the statement asserts.56 However, the idea that
parties have a right to interrogate, cross examine, and otherwise probe
the testimony being offered against them has been central to the
Anglo-American common law process ever since the repudiation of
the "Star Chamber" and other such inquisitorial methods used to
convict Sir Walter Raleigh.57
53. FED. R. EVID. 801.
54. Michael S. Pardo characterizes the admission of such classic hearsay as
essentially providing the jury with an epistemological surrogate for first-hand
knowledge, if the statement related by the testifying witness were allowed to be
admitted to establish the truth of the matter itself. See Michael S. Pardo, Testimony,
82 TUL. L. REv. 119, 150 (2007) ("From an epistemological standpoint, hearsay
statements function like formal, in-court testimony.").
55. For the reason that documents are often comprised in whole or in part of
statements and often are considered statements in and of themselves, a number of
hearsay exceptions exist which refer to hearsay specifically in document-based form.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Electronically Stored Information and the Ancient
Documents Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Fix It Before People Find Out About It,
17 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (2015) (discussing the "ancient document exception" in the
modem context); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 1339, 1415 (1987) (discussing documents containing statements of multiple
declarants); Fred Warren Bennett, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8): The Use of
Public Records in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 229, 229
(1997) (discussing the "public records exception" for certain types of documents
presumed to be reliable and therefore admissible); Thomas P. Egan & Thomas J.
Cunningham, Admission of Business Records into Evidence: Using the Business
Records Exception and Other Techniques, 30 DUQ. L. REv. 205 (1992) (discussing
the "business records exception" for certain documents regularly produced in the
course of business).
56. The common-law commentator on evidence James Bradley Thayer
theorized the rationale for the hearsay rule as deriving from the fact that while jurors
could construe evidence presented to them "in any way," witnesses "could testify
only of what they had seen and heard." Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur
Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REv. 909, 918
(1937).
57. The existence of, and doctrines surrounding, the Confrontation Clause of
the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are closely linked to hearsay concems,
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More specifically, hearsay is undesirable because whether or
not the statement is reliable cannot be determined in the declarant's
absence. 58 If John, an eyewitness to an accident, tells Shirley, who has
just arrived at the scene and did not see the accident, that the truck
which ran through the intersection and hit a pedestrian before speeding
off was "a green truck" and only Shirley is available to testify at trial,
the defense cannot conduct the cross examination that would reveal
that John was colorblind.5 9 Most testimony given by witnesses at trial
is susceptible to at least one of the several testimonial infirmities: the
passage of time since the event, precision of the witness's memory,
verbal ambiguity from a witness's choice of words, insincerity, and
sheer fault in perception. 60 The hearsay doctrine exists because while
the testimony of a witness appearing under oath at trial can be tested
against these, the statement of a non-appearing witness generally
cannot. 
6 1
to the degree that defendants have a constitutional right to confront witnesses who
are the source of "testimonial" hearsay evidence offered against them. The Supreme
Court has recently re-acknowledged the specific historical basis for this right. See
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015) (describing "the notorious use of ex
parte examination in Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason, which we have frequently
identified as 'the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed."'
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004))).
58. See Win. Garth Snider, The Linguistic Hearsay Rule: A Jurisprudential
Tool, 32 GoNz. L. REv. 331, 334 (1997) (suggesting that the hearsay rule exists as a
means of "subjecting the credibility of the witness testimony to an analysis of the
witness' perception, memory, and narration."). Commentators have further noted
that the reliability of even a first-hand eyewitness can be questionable at best. See
Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1452-53 (2007) (contrasting
the traditional Wigmorean view of eyewitness reliability with the more modem
evidence challenging juror competence to weigh the reliability of eyewitness
testimony, or factors weighing for or against eyewitness testimony).
59. Although the colorblindness example used here is the author's own
variation, this example is broadly similar to the hypothetical provided by the
Handbook of Federal Evidence, which characterizes circumstances similar to that
described above as "the classic hearsay statement." 6 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FED. EvID. § 801:1 (7th ed.).
60. FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules. See
also Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REv. 957, 958 (1974)
(discussing the infirmities at play with hearsay testimony); Michael S. Pardo,
Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REv. 119, 150 (2007) (referencing "the law's preference for
in-court testimony" as more reliable in contrast to hearsay, based on the oath and
threat of perjury, the ability of the jury to examine witness demeanor, and the
possibility of cross-examination).
61. See United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]hen an
out-of-court statement is offered as a testimonial assertion of the truth of the matter
stated, we are vitally interested in the credibility of the out-of-court declarant.
Because a statement made out of court is not exposed to the normal credibility
safeguards of oath, presence at trial, and cross-examination, the jury has no basis for
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Hearsay is perhaps considered to be a confusing doctrine
because of the myriad intricacies-the several-dozen "exclusions" and
"exceptions" to the rule-which modify the exclusionary effect of the
doctrine for, at best, murky reasons. 62 Without going into detail, the
basis of providing for admission of certain hearsay evidence under one
of the various exceptions is that certain classes of evidence are
considered to be less susceptible to the infirmities, and more likely to
be reliable for one reason or another. Ultimately, hearsay itself is a
simple doctrine: direct, rather than secondary evidence ought to be
required to prove one's case. However, much scholarly ink has been
spilt in the debate about whether the various "exceptions" themselves
do, in fact, properly identify "more reliable" forms of evidence, in
cases where secondhand evidence may be admitted; the following
subsection will discuss a handful of these debated points.
C. Definitions, Exemptions, Exclusions, and Exceptions
Despite the apparently rigid doctrine of exclusion laid down
by Rules 801 and 802, much evidence and testimony from secondhand
evidence is admitted at trial. The definitions provided for the words
"statement, "63 "declarant, ' '64 and "hearsay ' 65 within Rule 801 as legal
terms of art actually exclude from the very scope of hearsay many
evaluating the declarant's trustworthiness and thus his statement is considered
unreliable.")
62. See, e.g., Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe's Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and
Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 882-83 (2015) ("The hearsay rule, a
vexingly complex doctrine that purports to bar secondhand evidence in court, has
received significant attention from legal academics, who have pored over its myriad
intricacies in an effort to understand fully its contours and implications. The
difficulties that legal academics have confronted in developing a coherent
understanding of the hearsay doctrine is evidenced in part by their inability to agree
on the rationale for the rule's existence."); see also Pardo, 82 TUL. L. REv. at 148
(describing "the Byzantine structure of the [hearsay] rules" as "a trap for the wary"
that may either contribute or detract from just results); Glenn Weissenberger,
Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 1525 (1996) ("Evidence
professors seem to have a pathological compulsion to scrutinize and reorder the
hearsay system.").
63. FED. R. EviD. 801(a) ("Statement. 'Statement' means a person's oral
assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an
assertion.").
64. FED. R. EviD. 801(b) ("Declarant. 'Declarant' means the person who made
the statement.").
65. FED. R. EviD. 801(c) ("Hearsay. 'Hearsay' means a statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a
party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.").
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things that would facially appear to be barred under the doctrine. 66
Perhaps most commonly, almost any "statements" made by
"declarants" can be admitted for reasons which do not seek to "prove
the truth of the matter asserted," if the mere fact that the statement was
made, or that someone heard it, or some other reason makes the
existence of the statement in and of itself relevant, under Rule 401.67
Also, while many declarants make statements through documents-
i.e., communicated through a written medium-many documents
contain "statements" which are made by machines, rather than
"declarants;" under the definition, "declarants" must be "people." 68
Finally, many apparent statements are not actually considered to be
statements under all circumstances, such as testimony that a
potentially hearsay declarant asked the testifying witness the question,
"How are you doing today?" Questions-and also imperative
commands, such as "stay where you are"--may not contain an
assertion of anything, in the way that the statement "The sky is blue"
66. See Glen Weissenberger, Unintended Implications of Speech and the
Definition of Hearsay, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 857 (1992) ("[I]f conduct is not intended
as an assertion, it cannot be hearsay. Likewise, conduct and oral communication
intended to be assertive, but offered to prove something distinct from the intended
fact to be communicated, are not hearsay. And, of course, where the evidence is not
hearsay, it cannot be excluded by the hearsay proscription.").
67. "A statement may be logically relevant in two ways: (1) the mere fact that
it was made, or heard, by a particular person, regardless of its truth [or] falsity, may
tend to establish an ultimate fact in the case; or (2) the statement may be relevant
only if the statement is true." Norman M. Garland, An Overview of Relevance and
Hearsay: A Nine Step Analytical Guide, 22 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1039, 1052 (1993); see
also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) ("The hearsay rule does not prevent a
witness from testifying as to what he has heard; it is rather a restriction on the proof
of fact through extrajudicial statements."); United States v. Bursey, 85 F.3d 293,296
(7th Cir. 1996) ("[S]tatements that are offered not to prove 'the truth of the matter
asserted,' but for some other legitimate purpose, do not qualify as hearsay.").
68. "A printout of machine-generated information, as opposed to a printout of
information entered into a machine by a person, does not constitute hearsay because
a machine is not a person and therefore not a declarant capable of making a
statement." People v. Dinardo, 801 N.W.2d 73, 79 (2010) (discussing police breath
test machine). However, the testimony of Police Officer A that Police Officer B told
him or her, "This breath test machine was inspected this morning for use and is
properly calibrated" would be hearsay, if it was necessary to show not only that the
breath test machine indicated that the driver was drunk but also that it had been
recently inspected and calibrated.
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clearly asserts some putative truth.69 Thus, such oral declarations may
in fact fail the "statement" part of the definition of "hearsay." 70
Conversely, however, some of those definitions confusingly
include things that would facially appear outside the purview, or
contain nuances that appear to go directly against the examples laid
out above. For example, under certain circumstances, the attempt to
admit the lack of a statement-silence--can be deemed hearsay.71 A
report containing many readouts of machines compiled by a lab tech
who uses those readouts to reach some further conclusion now
contains an asserted truth value, predicated on the inferential
statements of the lab tech. Finally, Rule 801 (d) lays out a host of things
which, despite meeting the definitions in 801(a), (b), and (c), are
nonetheless "Statements That Are Not Hearsay." 72
The nuances of what is or is not even subject to the hearsay bar
from the outset, under Rule 801, is emblematic of why hearsay is
69. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir.
2009) ("[I]f the statements were questions or commands, they could not-absent
some indication that the statements were actually code for something else-be
offered for their truth because they would not be assertive speech at all. They would
not assert a proposition that could be true or false."); United States v. Thomas, 451
F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Questions and commands generally are not intended
as assertions, and therefore cannot constitute hearsay."); United States v. Wright,
343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[A] question is typically not hearsay because it
does not assert the truth or falsity of a fact. A question merely seeks answers and
usually has no factual content."); Quartararo v. Hanslmaier, 186 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.
1999) ("An inquiry is not an 'assertion,' and accordingly is not and cannot be a
hearsay statement.").
70. In a case where a U.S. marshal testified that he overheard a witness tell the
defendant that the price of his favorable testimony was $10,000, the effect of what
was overheard was merely the demand of "give me $10,000," and the issue therefore
becomes only the credibility of whether the marshal was reporting the demand
correctly. See United States v. Montana, 199 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 1999)
("Performative utterances are not within the scope of the hearsay rule, because they
do not make any truth claims. Had the marshal overheard Dodd tell Montana, 'your
father has promised me $10,000,' Dodd's overheard statement would have been
hearsay, because its value as evidence would have depended on its being truthful,
that is, on such a promise having actually been made.").
71. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy
Imperative, 65 DUKE L.J. 697, 708 (2016) ("[S]ilence in response to a statement by
someone else can qualify as a defendant's adoption of that statement for purposes of
the exemption of a party's own admissions from the hearsay prohibition."); see also
United States v. Hove, 52 F.3d 233, 236-37 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Silence may constitute
an adoption or belief in the truth of a statement if, under the circumstances, an
innocent person would have responded to the statement."); but see Jackson v. United
States, 250 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1958) ("Silence, in the absence of a duty to speak,
is not an admission.").
72. FED. R. EvID. 801(d).
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somewhat of a contentious subject. The "bar" on hearsay in 801
appears rigid, but only to the degree that it is clear to what 801 applies,
which is a matter altogether more complicated. Then, in 801(d),
several things are summarily excluded from the definition, for reasons
that appear to have little to do with reliability,7 3 or the reliability of
which is questionable at best.74 But even further, to the degree that the
later rules-Rules 803 and 804-appear to subsequently establish
specific, equally rigid "exceptions" to hearsay based upon the
supposed "reliability" of some hearsay statements made under certain
circumstances, the wisdom of the "reliability" in those rules is
somewhat questionable. Satisfaction, however, of one of the
exceptions often leads to relatively easy admission of hearsay
testimony.
The vagueness of what is or is not hearsay under 801,
compounded with around thirty subsequent exceptions whose wisdom
and rationale are equally vague, has resulted in decades of scholarship
and multiple conflicting, entrenched camps of practitioners,
academics, and judges, supporting every possible combination of the
following positions: whether the doctrine serves the purpose of
promoting reliable evidence or not; whether the doctrine should be
changed or not; whether the doctrine is in fact internally consistent or
not; and whether their own or others' personal, individual comfort
with the practical application and effective use of the existing doctrine
plays any role whatsoever in the state of the present hearsay system.
75
73. The defendant's own statements are almost universally admitted against
the defendant under 801(d)(2), on the rationale that the defendant must own their
own words, and may elect to take the stand and deny or place into context the
potentially problematic statements they themselves have made.
74. The statements of a "coconspirator," admitted under 801(d)(2)(E), bring up
the questions of the applicability of the rule itself and how to prove by extrinsic
evidence that the declarant witness is, in fact, a coconspirator. See Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (discussing the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard rendering the coconspirator exception operable). There is also
the further question of whether or not the potential motives of those who are in fact
coconspirators may lead them to make wholly unreliable false statements in many
or even most cases.
75. See generally David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 1 (2009); Marilyn J. Ireland, Deconstructing Hearsay's Structure: Toward A
Witness Recollection Definition of Hearsay, 43 VILL. L. REV. 529 (1998); James
Donald Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae
Reliability, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 203 (1995); Mueller, supra note 12, at 368; Roger
C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old andNew, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1991); Eleanor
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339 (1987);
Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51
(1987); Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974);
Ted Finman, Implied Assertions As Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules
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Turning specifically to the two rules providing exceptions to
hearsay, Rule 803 provides exceptions that apply whether or not the
original declarant is "available" as a witness, 76 and Rule 804 provides
exceptions that only apply under circumstances where the declarant is
considered to be "unavailable," as defined by the rule.7 7 Both Rule 803
and Rule 804, as described by the Advisory Committee, represent the
codification of principles that evolved out of the common law of
hearsay; 78 however, it is some of these venerable exceptions that draw
the sharpest criticism from commentators.
Under Rule 803, the theory is that "under appropriate
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the
declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available." 79
Three of the most venerable common law exceptions--old enough to
still commonly be referred to in Latin as the res gestae exceptions-
are 803(1)'s "Present Sense Impression," 803(2)'s "Excited
Utterance," and 803(3)'s "Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or
Physical Condition" rules. A present sense impression is a statement
"describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or
immediately after the declarant perceived it."'80 An excited utterance
is a statement "relating to a startling event or condition, made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement that [the event]
caused., 8 1 Statements of then-existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition are those which describe the declarant's then-existing "state
of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or
physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the
declarant's will." 82
These three rules are classic examples of hearsay exceptions
that are widely criticized as being based on unsubstantiated
assumptions about what may make a statement "reliable," enough so
of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682 (1962); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
76. FED. R. EvID. 803.
77. FED. R. EviD. 804
78. FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules; FED.
R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules.
79. FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules.
80. FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
81. FED.R.EvID. 803(2).
82. FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
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to relieve it from the harsh, exclusionary definition of 801.83 The
rationale for the present sense impression rule is that "substantial
contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of
deliberate or conscious misrepresentation." 84 Similarly, the rationale
for the excited utterance rule is that the effect of a shocking, exciting,
or otherwise extreme event upon a declarant "stills the capacity of
reflection," and that statements they therefore make are unlikely to be
consciously fabricated. 85 The "Then-Existing" rule of 803(3) is
predicated upon similar ideas, 86 that the declarant is likely to be
reliable in relating their immediate mental, physical, or emotional
state.
However, the idea that contemporaneity in time and
excitement of circumstance leads to reliability is "questionable at
best,"87 and even if assumed to be true, it remains difficult to establish
what those two nexuses in fact were in any objective fashion. The
Advisory Committee themselves even acknowledges that "the theory
of Exception [paragraph] (2) has been criticized., 88 Also, there is no
83. See, e.g., Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2).
Problems with the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST.
JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 250 (1999) (arguing that 803(2)'s "excited
utterance rule" is "a legal doctrine based upon a psychological theory, and modem
psychology has proven its core element to be a falsehood."); Moorehead, supra note
75, at 227-42 (arguing that neither excitedness in the context of 803(2) nor
contemporaneity under 803(1) or 803(3) are reliable guarantors of trustworthiness
or impossibility of fabrication); Aviva Orenstein, "My God!": A Feminist Critique
of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REv. 159, 180
(1997) (questioning the psychological basis for the excited utterance exception, and
proposing a specific hearsay exception for survivors of rape and crimes involving
sexual violence); cf Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live
in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 907, 914 (2001) (arguing that because present
sense impressions poses only two of four potential hearsay risks, they are sufficiently
reliable to warrant exception).
84. FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules.
85. Id. In a recent criticism of the rationale that such shocking or exciting
statements are not susceptible to conscious fabrication, Prof. Alan G. Williams has
recently argued that the statement from the famous scene in the movie Casablanca
where Captain Louis Renault, seconds after Rick Blain shoots a Nazi officer, falsely
says "Major Strasser has been shot-round up the usual suspects!"-a statement that
would be admitted as substantive proof that Blain did not shoot Strasser, under the
excited utterance exception. Alan G. Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 717 (2015).
86. The Advisory Committee calls Exception (3) "essentially a specialized
application of Exception [paragraph] (1), presented separately to enhance its
usefulness and accessibility." FED. R. EvrD. 803 advisory committee's note to 1972
proposed rules.
87. Moorehead, supra note 75, at 228.
88. FED. R. EviD. 803 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules.
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reason to believe that this truly reduces any of the previously discussed
testimonial infirmities which hearsay seeks to exclude.89
Rule 804 requires a showing that the declarant is
"unavailable," but upon showing that they qualify as unavailable,
certain statements may be admitted. Declarants are "unavailable"
when the subject matter of testimony is privileged, when they defy a
court order to testify, when they affirmatively testify that they do not
remember the subject matter, when they are physically absent despite
the proponent of the statement's reasonable attempts to procure their
presence, or most classically, when the declarant is unable to testify at
trial because they are infirm, ill, mentally incapable, or deceased. 90
The classic exception within Rule 804 that raises questions of
reliability is the "Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death"
exception, which allows "a statement that the declarant, while
believing the declarant's death to be imminent, made about its cause
or circumstances." 91 The classic, common-law basis for admission of
such a statement is that no declarant "who is immediately going into
the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie on his lips." 92 However,
similarly to the justifications for the res gestae exceptions to 803, it
seems facially clear that there is no particular reason to believe a
declarant will lose all ability to lie or misrepresent something, and in
fact, there exist conceivable reasons why they could do the exact
opposite; here, the Advisory Committee once again specifically
acknowledges that "the original religious justification for the
exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the
years." 93 Also as stated above, with this exception as well as the res
gestae 803 exceptions, there is no particular reason to assume that their
89. See Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 965
(1974) (discussing and critiquing the four testimonial infirmities of ambiguity,
insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous memory).
90. FED. R. EVxD. 804(a)(1). See also Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rules of
Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1079, 1081 (1987) (highlighting 804(a)'s distinction between unavailability of
the declarant's person, and the testimony itself).
91. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(2).
92. Regina v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (N. Wales Cir. 1881) (Lush, L.J.).
93. FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee note. Some commentators, however,
have argued that despite the relative secularization of society in the modem era,
"powerful psychological forces" still come to bear upon a declarant at the moment
of death, giving rise to increased reliability of such deathbed statements. See Glen
Weissenberger, Federal Rules of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from an
Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1107 (1987) ("In the more secular
world, however, this rationale for the [deathbed] exception has largely been
supplanted by the theory that the powerful psychological forces bearing on the
declarant at the moment of death engender a compulsion to speak truthfully").
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words will be less susceptible to the testimonial infirmities, even if it
is assumed that the imminence of death does indeed have some effect
upon the declarant's motivation to lie.
D. Opinions and Experts
Article VII of the FRE limits the ability of lay witnesses to give
opinion based testimony, and regulates the "expert" witness who may
give such testimony and the circumstances under which they may do
so. Rule 701 states that unless a witness is testifying as an expert,
opinion testimony is limited to that which is "(a) rationally based on
the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702." 94 Rule 702 states that a witness "who is qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify in the form of an opinion."95 However, they may do so
only if their scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge
is necessary for the fact finder to understand the evidence or determine
a fact at issue; if their testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; if
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
the expert has reliably applied those principles and methods to the
facts of the instant case. 96
Fact finders are not expected to be doctors, engineers,
chemists, or to otherwise possess any preternatural abilities to
understand the facts of any given case laid before them. 97 However,
establishing the proof of one or more elements of many cases may
require such specialized knowledge. As such, the law permits
qualified individuals to come before the fact finder and explain to them
how-based on the expertise generally relied upon by experts who do
understand the technical or specialized subject matter-those facts
should or should not be construed. 98
94. FED. R. EviD. 701.
95. FED. R. EvID. 702.
96. Id.
97. "(I)t is not to be inferred that the opinions of ordinary witnesses are
competent as to subjects which require special study and skill and which are proper
for the testimony of the expert as distinguished from the ordinary witness."
Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 847 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting 2
BURR W. JONES & SPENCER A. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE, § 14:3 (1972)).
98. In the forum of arbitration, however, this functions somewhat differently,
as multiple arbitrator panels often include industry specialists, such as in
construction arbitrations.
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A lay person may testify to their "opinion" in circumstances
where they testify to their state of mind at a particular point in time,
based upon "relevant historical or narrative facts that the witness has
perceived" which led them to believe a certain thing, and that state of
mind is itself relevant. 99 In such a situation, testimony of the state of a
lay person's mind at a time when they drew an inference based upon
facts is "not the expression of an opinion within the meaning of the
rule."' 0
0
The sharp divide between lay witnesses and experts shields the
fact finder from accepting conjecture from sources other than those
who have been shown to present some reliable basis for positing
conjecture. The statement of a lay witness that is based "solely upon
his own opinion, and which is merely a conclusion of an ultimate fact
in issue, has no probative value."''1 1 The statement of a qualified
expert, however, may be truly necessary in order to prove certain
elements-causation, typically-which require not only facts to be
established, but moreover interpreted or explained. In an insurance
subrogation case subsequent to a restaurant fire, the insurer sought to
recover from a company whose fluorescent light "ballast" arguably
caused the fire; expert testimony was necessary, however, to explain
a particular scientific principle which would have made it possible for
ballast burning at 340 degrees to ignite a nearby stockpile of wood,
which was shown to require an ignition temperature of 400 degrees or
above. 102
However, the requirements to certify the expert themselves
provide another important shielding of the fact finder from unreliable
opinion. In the above-mentioned dispute about causation of a fire, the
expert testimony seeking to introduce the scientific theory explaining
the difference in ignition temperature was excluded, on the basis that
the proffered theory was "insufficiently reliable even for trained
experts," under FRE 702.103
99. Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980).
100. Phillips v. United States, 356 F.2d 297, 308 (9th Cir. 1965) (admitting lay
witness opinion in a mail fraud case, where lay witnesses testified about their belief
in the suitability of land for residential, recreational, and sound investment purposes,
based upon the representations about the land in the fraudulent sales materials).
101. Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1318, 1325 (Cust.
Ct. 1979).
102. Truck Insurance Exchange v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2004) (discussing "pyrolysis").
103. Id. at 1216.
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Relatively recent Supreme Court cases1"4 have expanded the
realm of who and what may be considered an "expert," as well as the
subject of expert testimony. Echoing those cases, Rule 702 provides
important safeguards against charlatans, mystics, and hacks
masquerading as experts, as well as against perhaps-legitimate experts
who nonetheless peddle scientific theories of questionable veracity. 1 05
Although Daubert opened the doors to testimony that might not yet be
"generally accepted" as practice in whatever the field of expertise was,
the acceptance of a theory-alongside other checks such as peer
review and replication of results-remains relevant under 702. Kumho
expanded the definition of what constituted "expert testimony"
beyond simple scientific testimony, allowing many individuals whose
purported area of expertise may not require an advanced degree to
nonetheless be qualified. However, the requirements that "experts"
and the testimony they provide be avouchable in some way-whether
by general acceptance, peer review, known error rate, repeatable
process-and that the expert performed some specific application of
their knowledge to the facts of the instant case ensures that the fact
finder is not exposed to opinions which are either wholly unreliable,
or not necessarily meaningful in the context of the specific case.
E. Authenticity & Personal Knowledge
Two other rules within the FRE concern principles that
underlie all evidence that may potentially be offered. Within Article
VI, which concerns "Witnesses," Rule 602 states that "[a] witness may
testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support
a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter."'' 0 6
Within Article IX, Rule 901 states that "[t]o satisfy the requirement of
authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must
produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what
the proponent claims it is."10 7
There is a close relationship between authenticity and the need
for personal knowledge, and each of the previously discussed
104. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993);
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
105. See Truck Insurance Exchange v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1216
(10th Cir. 2004). (referring to the excluded testimony about the "pyrolysis" theory,
the court somewhat apologetically acknowledged that "[t]hough the theory of long-
term, low-temperature ignition of wood is an interesting one that eventually may be
sufficiently tested and researched to serve as the basis for an expert opinion under
Rule 702.. . the foundation for pyrolysis has not yet reached that point").
106. FED. R. EVID. 602.
107. FED. R. EVID. 901.
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principles of evidence law. "Authentication and identification," the
Advisory Committee acknowledges, "represent a special aspect of
relevancy." 10 8 The personal knowledge requirement guarantees that a
witness actually did witness an event described, or perceived in some
way the thing to which they testified. Personal knowledge bridges
important gaps, such as those created by the hearsay exceptions; a
witness who did not see an event-but who heard a declarant's
statement about the event-has the level of personal knowledge
necessary to give testimony about the statement. That testimony will
be admissible if the statement is outside the definition of hearsay or
falls within one of the exceptions or exclusions.
II. EVIDENCE RULES IN ARBITRATION
This Part shall discuss the various rules within different
arbitration rule regimes. Arbitration is a creature of contract law, and
parties have the option to exert significant control over the process.
However, many parties opt to use bodies of rules promulgated by a
variety of different mediation and dispute resolution organizations.
These organizations have, over the years, provided rule regimes, each
of which has some rule or series of rules describing how the arbitrator
may control the introduction of evidence, and suggesting how to
consider evidence entered when making their awards.
The treatment of evidence among arbitral regimes exhibit
broad similarities in that arbitrators are generally given relatively wide
latitude to admit what they wish. The specific treatment of evidence
within the various bodies of rules, however, differs: some regimes
cabin discussion of evidence to its own rules, while others package it
within rules governing the overall conduct of the arbitration hearing.
Unlike the FRE, none of these rules or rule regimes, however, provide
a comprehensive framework for analyzing evidentiary admissibility.
While some regimes reference the FRE, it is only to distinguish the
need to follow them, rather than an incorporation of the explicit
concepts of evidence law in the arbitral forum.
Prior to discussing the rule regimes, however, it is necessary
to explain the federal statutory scheme within which those rules
function.
108. FED. R. EvrD. 901 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules.
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A. The Federal Arbitration Act, and Arbitration
Generally
In civil litigation, failure to properly apply the FRE can
sometimes, although rarely, lead to reversal on appeal. 109 Arbitrations,
however, largely exist to provide a means of dispute resolution where
the result is final and non-appealable. Arbitration is "a matter of
contract,"1 10 which is further governed by a federal statute, the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 ("FAA").111 A party seeking to vacate an
arbitration award based upon some purported error in the arbitrator's
conduct or admission of evidence must, therefore, frame the challenge
to state a claim under the FAA.
The FAA lays out certain statutory bases for judicial review of
arbitral decisions. Also, under common law principles, which still
arguably survive in some circuits, an arbitrator's decision can be
reversed for "manifest disregard" of the law. 112 Under Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter113 and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp., 114 courts may only vacate in "unusual
circumstances,"'1 15 because maintaining a limited judicial review is
essential to preserve the efficiency value of arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution. " 6 Arbitration awards are not generally reviewable
109. There is generally wide discretion under the FRE allowing impeachment
of credibility to establish bias of witness. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488
U.S. 153, 172 (1988) (partial exclusion of an incomplete letter found to be "clear
abuse of discretion"); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1984) ("The
standard of review applicable to the evidentiary rulings of the district court is abuse
of discretion").
110. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960)
111. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2015). Because arbitration is also a creature of
contract law, a flaw in the arbitration clause or the contract itself may give rise to a
collateral attack, premised upon some substantive contract law doctrine. This form
of attack is, however, beyond the scope of this article, as attacking the underlying
validity of the contract or the clause under contract law does not take into account
the conduct or process of the arbitration itself.
112. See, e.g., Dewan v Walia, 544 F App'x 240, 242 (4th Cir 2013) (vacating
an award that was the product of manifest disregard of the law).
113. 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013).
114. 559 U.S. 662, 693 (2010).
115. See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013);
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 693 (2010) (both
quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).
116. Oxford, 133 S. Ct., at 2068 (interpreting Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008)).
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for errors of either law or fact.117 Section X of the FAA provides four
exclusive grounds for vacatur, which collectively hinge on providing
a fundamental fair process, rather than strict procedural mandates.
Section 10(a)(1) vacates awards "procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;" Section 10(a)(2) vacates awards where there was
"evident partiality" in the arbitrators towards a given party; Section
10(a)(4)-the section giving rise to the "manifest disregard"
doctrine-permits vacatur "where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."' 1 8
The final section is Section 10(a)(3), which I will discuss in more
depth.
Out of the four sections, only section 10(a)(3) provides that
arbitrators may be overturned for "refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy."'1 19 Section 10(a)(3) is a significantly
limited basis for reversing an arbitration decision. 120 Overall, reversal
of an arbitral decision for any reason is rare, and in many cases where
an arbitrator has made an evidentiary decision the court has upheld the
decision regardless of whether the evidence was admitted or
excluded. 12 1 Courts have interpreted the FAA to mean that although
117. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 671 ("[I]n order to obtain that relief,
they must clear a high hurdle. It is not enough for petitioners to show that the panel
committed an error--or even a serious error."); see also Seed Holdings, Inc. v. Jiffy
Int'l AS, 5 F. Supp. 3d 565, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Arbitration awards are not
reviewed for errors made in law or fact.").
118. 9U.S.C.§ 10(a)
119. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2015) (emphasis added).
120. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
CommercialArbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 746 (1996) (characterizing all
10(a) grounds as "extraordinarily narrow," and subsequently discussing 10(a)(3)).
121. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 665 F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir.
2011) (upholding award despite arbitrator's exclusion of testimony regarding certain
events significantly prior to the dispute as "too remote"); Century Indem. Co. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, subscribing to Retrocessional Agreement
Nos. 950548, 950549, 950646, 584 F.3d 513, 559 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding award
after arbitrators considered, but subsequently deemed evidence from certain witness
statements "irrelevant"); Howard Univ. v. Metro. Campus Police Officer's Union,
512 F.3d 716, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding award despite arbitrator's arguably
erroneous exclusion of union chief negotiator's testimony based upon attorney-
client privilege), and; Hudson v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 484 F.3d 496, 504 (8th Cir.
2007) (upholding award despite arbitrator's refusal to hear evidence of plaintiff's
tort claims after arbitrators heard argument from both parties, and determined that
such claims were barred by resjudicata); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (upholding award where arbitrators excluded testimony of brokers as
"unimportant" and "cumulative"); cf Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Servs.
(U.S.), INC., 846 F. Supp. 2d 298, 304 (D. Me.), aft'd, 695 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 2012)
(upholding arbitration award despite panel's "procedural irregularity" in relying
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arbitrators "must give each of the parties to the dispute an adequate
opportunity to present its evidence and arguments,"1 22 they are "not
required to hear all the evidence proffered by a party' 123 Arbitrators
have indeed been upheld for decisions to exclude significant evidence,
based on reasons similar to policies found within the FRE. In Rai v.
Barclays Capital Inc., an arbitrator's decision was upheld after not
only refusing to postpone a hearing based upon a witness's inability to
appear and testify, but moreover deciding to exclude that witness's
affidavit on the basis that cross-examination was not possible. 124 In
LIL 33rd Street Associates, LLC v. Pitcairn Properties Inc., an
arbitrator's decision to exclude hearsay evidence about the valuation
of a property based specifically on the fact that the evidence was
hearsay was upheld. 12
5
Conversely, an arbitrator has "substantial leeway to admit any
evidence that [they] fmd[] useful-even hearsay evidence."' 126 In
Raiola v. Union Bank of Switzerland, LLC, an arbitrator decided to
admit handwritten notes over objections that they were hearsay and
did not qualify for the business record exception. 127 The court upheld
the arbitrator's decision to admit the evidence on the basis that the
notes were clearly material and pertinent to the conflict. 128 In Raiola,
upon evidence outside the record to construe an ambiguity in parties' contract). But
see Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., USA, 70 F.3d 847, 850 (5th
Cir. 1995) (vacating arbitration award where arbitrator prevented employer from
presenting additional evidence-the discharged employee's cigarette stub found in
discharged employee's vehicle which tested positive for marijuana-after justifying
the exclusion by telling the employer that the chemical report confirming the
presence of marijuana had been admitted as a business record, but then citing the
employer's failure to present evidence the employer had been told not to present as
a predicate for ignoring the results).
122. Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395
(5th Cir. 2003) (confirming arbitral award despite refusal to compel production of
certain financial documents).
123. Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997)
(confirming arbitral award despite exclusion of testimony by company official).
124. Rai v. Barclays Capital Inc., 739 F.Supp.2d 364, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
125. LJL 33rd St. Associates, LLC v. Pitcairn Properties, Inc., 725 F.3d 184,
187 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that arbitrator's exclusion of hearsay was not abuse of
discretion, and confirnming award).
126. ARMA, S.R.O. v BAE Sys. Overseas, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 245, 263
(D.D.C. 2013) (explaining further that "An arbitrator may likewise opt to expedite a
proceeding by excluding evidence and testimony that it finds irrelevant or
duplicative").
127. Raiola v. Union Bank of Switzerland, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that admission of the notes did not deprive adverse party
of fundamentally fair trial).
128. Id.
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the court also observed that the arbitrator's findings on credibility
were non-reviewable. 129 In Farkas v. Receivable Financing Corp., the
court made direct reference to the AAA commercial rules in holding
that arbitrators "did not exceed their powers by considering hearsay
evidence."' 3 ° Arbitrators are also permitted to admit evidence that is
speculative in nature.' 31
Ultimately, however, arbitrators do not automatically expose
themselves to vacatur "in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy."' 132 Section 10(a)(3) "cannot be read...
to intend that every failure to receive relevant evidence constitutes
misconduct which will require the vacation of an arbitrator's
award. ,
133
Parties contracting to resolve disputes by arbitration can
mutually agree to any governing rules or procedures in advance, or, at
the time of the arbitration, make preferences known to the arbitrator. 134
Many parties, however, opt to utilize various bodies of rules already
available and promulgated by nonprofit and private entities
specializing in various forms of alternative dispute resolution. The
discussion will now shift to an examination of some of the well-known
rule regimes and how they deal specifically with the admission of
evidence in arbitration.
B. The American Arbitration Association ("AAA ")
The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") is a private
organization specializing in offering various forms of dispute
resolution services. As one of those services, the AAA promulgates a
129. Id. ("[I]t is not within this Court's authority to question that
determination.").
130. Farkas v. Receivable Fin. Corp., 806 F. Supp. 84, 87 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(upholding arbitration award in employment dispute arbitrated under AAA rules);
see also Petroleum Separating Co. v. Interamerican refining Corp., 296 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (upholding arbitrator's decision in payment amount dispute
to admit hearsay evidence from both parties, in context of an arbitration subject to
AAA rules).
131. D.E.I., Inc. v. Ohio and Vicinity Regional Council of Carpenters, 155 F.
App'x 164, 170 (6th Cir. 2005).
132. Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
Subscribing to Retrocessional Agreement Nos. 950548, 950549, 950646, 584 F.3d
513, 557 (3d Cir. 2009).
133. Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397
F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 1968).
134. See Radvany, supra note 2, at 729, 741 (discussing party choice).
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number of rule regimes for different kinds of arbitrations. 3 Under the
rules for commercial arbitration, R-34 discusses "Evidence." '1 36 The
text of R-34 reads:
(a) The parties may offer such evidence as is relevant
and material to the dispute and shall produce such
evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an
understanding and determination of the dispute.
Conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be
necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the presence
of all of the arbitrators and all of the parties, except
where any of the parties is absent, in default, or has
waived the right to be present.
(b) The arbitrator shall determine the admissibility,
relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered and
may exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be
cumulative or irrelevant.
(c) The arbitrator shall take into account applicable
principles of legal privilege, such as those involving
the confidentiality of communications between a
lawyer and client.
(d) An arbitrator or other person authorized by law to
subpoena witnesses or documents may do so upon the
request of any party or independently. 137
R-34 presents a fairly typical example of how evidence is
handled in arbitration. The rule does not explicitly direct arbitrators to
ignore evidence law but specifically states that adherence is not
required. The only guiding principle specifically stated within the rule
in the (a) section is "relevance" and "materiality" and the only basis
135. See Rules, Forms & Fees, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
https://www.adr.org/Rules (last visited March 29, 2017) (Commercial Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedures, Construction Industry Rules and Mediation
Procedures, Consumer Arbitration Rules, Employment Arbitration Rules and
Mediation Procedures, Labor Arbitration Rules, Intemational Dispute Resolution
Procedures).
136. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-34 (2016) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES].
137. Id. (emphasis added).
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of exclusion specifically stated in the (b) section other than lack of
relevance is evidence that is cumulative.
AAA R-35 discusses "Evidence by Written Statements and
Post-Hearing Filing of Documents or Other Evidence," and is worth
noting because some of the provisions suggest that the AAA rules are
at least cognizant of some other evidentiary concerns.138 The (a)
section of the rule requires that parties give written notice for any
witness who has given a written statement. 139 If that witness fails to
appear for examination in person at the arbitration, "the arbitrator may
disregard the written witness statement and/or expert report of the
witness or make such other order as the arbitrator may consider to be
just and reasonable."140 The (b) section of the rule goes on to provide
fallback provisions for the situation where a witness who is
"represented by a party to be essential" is unable to testify. The (a)
section of R-35 appears designed to bolster R-32, "Conduct of
Proceedings," the (c) section of which requires that in the presentation
of evidence through a witness, the arbitrator "provide an opportunity
for cross-examination. ' 41
C. JAMS
Founded in 1979, JAMS is the "largest private alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) provider in the world" and employs almost
300 full-time neutrals, including retired judges and attorneys. 142 JAMS
arbitration and mediation services provide various sets of rules and
procedures to govern arbitrations. 143
JAMS provides several arbitral rule regimes, such as the
"Comprehensive," "Streamlined," and "Employment" rules. All of
these regimes discuss evidence, but within the context of a broader
rule. In both the "Comprehensive" and "Employment" regime, Rule
22 governs "The Arbitration Hearing," while in the "Streamlined"
regime the same name is attached to Rule 17. Under "Comprehensive"
and "Employment" Rule 22(c) and "Streamlined" Rule 17(c), "[t]he
138. Id. at R-35.
139. Id at R-35(a).
140. Id.
141. Id. at R-32(c).
142. About JAMS, JAMS ARB., MEDIATION, & ADR SERVICES,
http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus-overview/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
143. ADR Clauses, Rules, and Procedures, JAMS ARB., MEDIATION, & ADR
SERVICES, http://www.jamsadr.com/adr-rules-procedures/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015)
(referring to specific rule bodies, the "Comprehensive" and "Streamlined" rules.
JAMS also features "Class Action," "Construction," and "Employment" arbitration
rules, which are not discussed in this Article).
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arbitrator shall require witnesses to testify under oath" if requested by
a party or at the discretion of the arbitrator.144
Evidence is specifically discussed in the (d) section of both
Rule 17 and Rule 22. Similar to AAA, JAMS directs arbitrators that
"[s]trict conformity to the rules of evidence is not required, except that
the Arbitrator shall apply applicable law relating to privileges and
work product." 145 However, JAMS goes further than AAA in
suggesting to the arbitrator how to manage the evidence offered,
affirmatively directing the arbitrator that they "shall consider evidence
that he or she finds relevant and material to the dispute, giving the
evidence such weight as is appropriate."'146 Under the plain language
of this rule, it would seem that JAMS forbids the absolute exclusion
of any evidence which satisfies the general requirement of relevancy
and materiality, instead charging the arbitrators to simply give it
"appropriate" weight, which may be none. The JAMS rules do not
specifically say that an arbitrator may not exclude evidence, except for
cases where the evidence is "immaterial" or "unduly repetitive." This
once again appears to echo the AAA rule, which speaks of exclusion
of cumulative evidence.
The plain language reading of the rule, however, may be
somewhat tempered by the fact that the rule does provide that "[t]he
Arbitrator may be guided in that determination [of "relevant and
material"] by principles contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence or
any other applicable rules of evidence."' 147 This appears to allow
arbitrators some leeway when determining whether or not to allow
certain evidence to be admitted. In each of the three rule bodies-
Comprehensive, Streamlined, and Employment-the text of the rule
is identical. In all three versions of subsection (f), the JAMS rules
preclude parties from offering, and arbitrators admitting as evidence,
prior settlement offers made by parties. This parallels FRE 408, which
prohibits introduction of similar evidence on the basis within the
Article IV "Relevance" framework.
Even if this is the case, however, it would still be a powerful
exclusionary provision; an arbitrator who looks within Article IV of
the FRE and nowhere else can still exclude improper character
evidence, evidence of subsequent remedial measures, evidence of
144. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES Rule 22(c)
(2014); JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES Rule 22(c);
JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES Rule 17(c) (same quoted
material).
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id.
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insurance, and many other things which the FRE frame within
"Relevance and its Limits." Thus, it is at least arguable that an
arbitrator, functioning under the JAMS rules could-if so inclined-
exercise substantial discretion to exclude proffered evidence, and yet
not violate the apparent policy of the JAMS rules to admit all evidence
that is "relevant and material." By using the FRE as a guide, the
arbitrator could exclude from the definition of "relevant and material"
those things that, under the FRE, are excluded by Article IV.
D. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA')
Arbitrations
FINRA is a private, self-regulatory organization ("SRO") that,
in 2007, consolidated the regulatory functions of the NASD and the
NYSE. FINRA conducts arbitrations in securities disputes, under its
own regime of rules and procedures, typically between investors and
broker dealers, or disputes between two industry parties. 148 FINRA
arbitration is largely compulsory, as securities brokers and dealers
must be members of FINRA in order to participate in the securities
arena. Members of FINRA submit to FINRA arbitration when disputes
arise between themselves. Correspondingly, FINRA broker dealers
typically require customers to similarly submit to arbitration and
include an arbitration clause in their account opening statements. 149
148. While FINRA does promulgate two sets of rules, this subsection refers
only to the set which governs disputes between investors and individual entities
registered with FINRA, such as cases between investors and brokers or broker
dealers. This set of rules is referred to as the "Customer Code." The rules governing
disputes between two industry parties are referred to as the "Industry Code." FINRA
MANUAL, FINRA RULES Rules 12000, 13000 (2017),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element-id=607
[hereinafter FINRA RULE].
149. See Jill Gross, The Improbable Birth and Conceivable Death of the
Securities Arbitration Clinic, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 597, 599 (2014)
(discussing the "ubiquitous arbitration clause" in customer agreements from
brokerages); see also North American Securities Administrators Association,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is it Fair and Voluntary?, at 1 (Sep. 15, 2009),
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NASAA-Arbitration-
Statement-9.15.09.pdf ("Today, almost every broker-dealer includes in their
customer agreements, a predispute arbitration provision that forces public investors
to submit all disputes that they may have with the firm and/or its associated persons
to mandatory arbitration"); Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR,
11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 426 (2006) (outlining the development of the
use of the pre-dispute arbitration clause).
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FINRA also provides arbitration services, governed by a rule
regime that discusses the admission of evidence. For arbitrations
involving customer disputes, Rule 12604 states that:
(a) The panel will decide what evidence to admit. The
panel is not required to follow state or federal rules of
evidence.
(b) Production of documents in discovery does not
create a presumption that the documents are admissible
at the hearing. A party may state objections to the
introduction of any document as evidence at the
hearing to the same extent that any other objection may
be raised in arbitration. 150
The FINRA evidence rule does not specifically provide for
exclusion. However, the fact that it draws a distinction between
material produced and material that may or may not ultimately be
admissible at the hearing suggests that circumstances exist whereby
some material may be excluded. More importantly however, the
discussion of state or federal rules of evidence in the negative-for
example, that the panel "is not required to follow"-arguably implies
something other than mere rejection of the FRE principles. One
reasonable construction is that arbitrators should start from such rules,
but may then use their discretion to diverge from them in appropriate
circumstances. Alternatively, it could be construed that arbitrators
may generally do what they please, but when a party makes an
objection predicated on policies contained in such rules, they should
at least consider the basis of the objection-to the degree that it stems
from the rules of evidence-to carry some weight, despite the fact that
they may still admit the evidence.
E. CPR Arbitrations
The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and
Resolution Arbitrations (CPR) is an independent nonprofit
organization that helps global businesses prevent and resolve
commercial disputes efficiently and effectively.1 51 Under Rule 12 of
CPR's rules, "Evidence and Hearings," the arbitral tribunal has control
over the form of proceedings, and is empowered to "determine the
150. FINRA RULE, supra note 148.
151. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION
ARBITRATIONS, https://www.cpradr.org/about (last visited September 15, 2016).
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manner in which the parties shall present their cases. 152 Parties may
be permitted to submit briefs or pre-hearing memorandums, stating the
facts, claims, applicable law, and requests for relief.153 However, this
must also include "[a] statement of the nature and manner of
presentation of the evidence, including the name, capacity and subject
of testimony of any witnesses to be called and an estimate of the
amount of time required for each witness's direct testimony." '154 The
tribunal may ultimately determine whatever method of presentation of
evidence it deems appropriate. 155 When it does so, the tribunal "is not
required to apply any rules of evidence used in judicial proceedings,
provided, however, that the tribunal shall apply any lawyer-client
privilege and work product immunity it deems applicable."' 156
Regardless of what evidence is submitted and whether a party asserts
privilege or work product immunity, it is ultimately the Tribunal who
"shall determine the applicability of any privilege or immunity and the
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence
offered." 157 Finally, CPR's rules provide that the Tribunal may require
further evidence from the parties, and appoint neutral experts to give
testimony and be subject to cross examination and rebuttal. 158 Thus,
CPR allows the arbitrator to determine the admissibility of evidence
while not requiring him/her to apply any formal rules of evidence. This
allows for some flexibility as an arbitrator can use his/her discretion
when deciding whether or not to exclude proffered evidence.
III. PRESENTING EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION
This part will examine the differences between the regime of
evidentiary admissibility under the FRE, and presenting evidence
within arbitration as described by arbitration rules.
As the foregoing makes clear, arbitration largely examines
whether evidence is (a) relevant and material and (b) not unduly
cumulative, while characterizing the other prominent doctrines and
issues dealt with in the FRE as questions of weight, not admissibility.
An arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal is entrusted to decide the impact of
152. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION
ARBITRATIONS, CPR PROCEDURES & ARBITRATION CLAUSES: ADMINISTERED
ARBITRATION RULES Rule 12.1, available at https://www.cpradr.org/resource-
center/rules/arbitration/administered-arbitration-rules [hereinafter CPR RULE].
153. Id. Rule 12.1.
154. Id. Rule 12.1(e).
155. Id. Rule 12.2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Rule 12.3.
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such evidence, and what, if any, weight to give it when making his,
her, or their decision. Correspondingly, greater emphasis on
evidentiary principles in arbitration may be more useful to counsel in
arbitration, as the ability to make evidence arguments about
material-regardless of whether or not it will be admitted-can
meaningfully impact the weight given certain pieces of evidence by
arbitrators.
A. The Federal Rules versus Arbitration Rules
There is little doubt that the FRE and case law interpreting the
Rules provide a significantly more nuanced framework than the
various arbitration rules for the admission of evidence. The various
articles of the FRE take account of numerous different issues of
admissibility. 159 The arbitration rule regimes surveyed typically apply
only to the thresholds of "relevance" and "materiality."160 Without the
strictures of the FRE, arbitrators will often admit evidence that would
be inadmissible in federal courts. A witness at an arbitral hearing may
testify to hearsay or double hearsay, or a document may be produced
during discovery and subsequently admitted with no witness to
provide the proper foundation for the document.
The difference in the rigor and application of evidentiary rules
between arbitration and civil litigation controlled by the FRE stems
from different considerations. One is the fact that because arbitrators
are typically lawyers and therefore trained in evidence, they are
perceived to be more "trusted" 161 than jurors and more able to perform
in a role similar to that of a bench trial judge.162 Also, there is a notion
159. See generally discussion supra Part I (discussing relevance, hearsay,
opinions and experts, personal knowledge).
160. See generally discussion supra Part II (AAA Rules, JAMS rules, FINRA
rules, CPR rules).
161. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuDICIAL EVIDENCE 15-16
(1827) ("Where is the consistency between this utter distrust of juries, and the
implicit faith bestowed, with so much affection, on the decisions they are permitted
to give on such evidence as they are permitted to receive?").
162. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 165-66 (2006) (discussing how "[n]umerous
American trial judges" have resisted application of formal evidence law principles
in non-jury trials); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through
Arbitration, 56 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 233, 243 n.39 (2008) ("The arbitral hearing is not
unlike a bench trial in which the absence of a jury alleviates the need for elaborate
rule frameworks through which information is filtered. In fact, especially in
California, arbitrators often are retired judges who have extensive familiarity with
legal procedures for trial."); Michael Z. Green, No Strict Evidence Rules in Labor
and Employment Arbitration, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 533, 535 (2009)
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that arbitration should be an efficient, cost-effective process. 1 63 This
notion informs the discovery regime at work within arbitration as
much as it informs the evidentiary regime. The broad discovery
regime of Rule 26 unearths substantial amounts of relevant and
material information. 164 However, that regime is expensive to
administer and time consuming to navigate for litigators; moreover,
the information discovered is susceptible to all the various problems
the FRE were designed to guard against.
Arbitration, however, benefits from its own substantially more
limited perspective on how to administer a discovery regime. The
various arbitration rule regimes typically feature significantly more
limited discovery than what would be permitted under Rule 26, with
one arbitration regime, FINRA, even using pre-made "Discovery
Guides," 165 which specify certain documents or types of documents
that are presumed to be discoverable.'1 66 Also, in discovery, arbitrators
are arguably supposed to exercise a more "managerial" role in
controlling discovery, for the purpose of limiting time and expense. 1
67
The limited nature of arbitration discovery provides one way
to understand the apparently liberal approach to evidence. In the
("[A]rbitration proceedings and bench trials are similar-as contrasted with jury
trials"); Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WiS.
L. REv. 463, 464-65 (2008) (arguing that one of the primary purposes of evidence
law is to "carefully screen the evidence to which jurors are exposed, frequently
withholding relevant information on the basis offears that jurors would use it in an
irrational or legally impermissible manner.") (emphasis added). However, it must
also be noted that while many arbitrators come to be selected for their experience
within the field derived from years of practice, this does not necessarily imply
intrinsic competence with evidence law, a subject that many lawyers struggle with
in practice. See James A. Wright, "The Use of Hearsay in Arbitration," Arbitration
1992: Improving Arbitral and Advocacy Skills, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIrH
ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 290-91 (1992) ("Many
advocates are unskilled in the intricacies of hearsay evidence. Even many lawyers
are unable to determine whether an offered item is hearsay.").
163. See generally Radvany, supra note 2, at 749 (describing the efficiency
and financial value of arbitration).
164. See discussion supra Part I.
165. See FINRA RULE, supra note 148, at Rule 12506(a) (requiring Director
to notify parties of the location of the FINRA Discovery Guide).
166. The list of documents, however, is not dispositive; counsel in FINRA
arbitrations may request further discovery, or raise objection to documents contained
within the Discovery Guide. The Guide simply provides a useful starting point,
which often saves time or even provides sufficient discovery to resolve the dispute.
Discovery beyond, or objection to discovery within the terms of the Guide may be
granted upon showing of appropriate cause by the party requesting or opposing
discovery under the Guide.
167. See Radvany, supra note 2, at 734 (providing the AAA rule requiring the
arbitrator to manage information exchange with a view to achieving an efficient).
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course of providing limited discovery in arbitration, the arbitral
process itself limits the ability of parties to conduct discovery in a the
same manner as they would if the case were being litigated in court.
Parties can discover evidence in an inadmissible form through wide
discovery, but they can also use that knowledge to find the same
evidence in an admissible form or otherwise find a means of admitting
the evidence within the FRE. In arbitration, however, a party may not
be able to call a witness to provide authentication testimony to put a
document into a non-hearsay context, because the arbitrator might
limit its presentation of witnesses. Allowing a process similar to civil
litigation would also take significantly more time and increase the
expense of arbitrating that dispute. In arbitration, however, the intent
of the process is largely concerned with saving both time and expense.
Thus, in arbitration, it is necessary for the relatively relaxed
application of the rules of evidence. Limitation of discovery leads to
circumstances where much of the evidence in arbitration may raise
hearsay concerns, may not come with a certifying witness, or may not
have witnesses knowledgeable or willing enough to testify.
B. Dangers ofAdmission or Exclusion
Though under the FRE much of the evidence typically utilized
in arbitration would be excluded, arbitrators admit such evidence
frequently. A 2012 survey of 401 arbitrators found that in response to
the question, "Do you exclude evidence that is not admissible under
the evidentiary standards you believe would be appropriate outside the
arbitration forum rather than take the evidence and give it such weight
as you deem appropriate," 33.9% of arbitrators would "never" exclude
such evidence, while 55.2% would "sometimes (i.e., around 25% of
the time)" exclude such evidence.' 68
The decision-making of arbitrators can arguably be tainted by
the admission of evidence that is subject to evidentiary problems. To
one degree or another, arbitrators and judges are similar-both are
exposed to evidence that would be inadmissible under the FRE. With
respect to judges, courts and commentators have long scrutinized the
ability of judges to remain unaffected by such exposure. A study by
Andrew Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, and Jeffrey Rachlinski concluded
that judges who heard favorable-but-inadmissible evidence were
168. Edna Sussman, Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious Psychological
Influences and What You Can Do About Them, 24 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 487, 491
(2013). Sussman also elaborates further upon the methodology of the survey. See id.
at 491, n.22 (concluding that while her sample is not completely representative of
the overall population of arbitrators, it provides a useful benchmark).
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significantly more likely to rule in favor of the proponent of the
inadmissible evidence.1 69 Outside the context of judges, judges like
Learned Hand and Justice Robert Jackson have called the attempt to
ignore inadmissible evidence in general as "mental gymnastic[s]," and
"unmitigated fiction."'17
Thus, based on the fact that within arbitration much evidence
is admitted despite the fact it would not pass muster under the FRE,
there is little doubt that arbitrators are at least somewhat at risk of
being influenced by questionable evidence. Although the arbitrator is
directed to "weigh" evidence "for what it is worth,"'17 1 such a directive
presumes that an arbitrator has the ability to do exactly what some
commentators and judges are highly skeptical of: not be misled by
evidence of questionable veracity.
The significance of this danger comes from the fact that
evidence that would be excluded under the FRE is no less misleading
169. See generally Andrew J. Wistrich et. al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251,
1251-52 (2005) ("We conclude that judges are generally unable to avoid being
influenced by relevant but inadmissible information of which they are aware.").
Other commentators have described a similar "backfire" effect, occurring
specifically when jurors are given limiting instructions. See Joel D. Lieberman &
Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial
Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677, 689
(2000) ("The backfire effect occurs when jurors pay greater attention to information
after it has been ruled inadmissible than if the judge had said nothing at all about the
evidence and allowed jurors to consider it.").
170. See Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Judge Hand
describing limiting instructions for the jury as recommendations in mental
gymnastics); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (Justice Jackson describing as "unmitigated fiction" the idea that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury). Most discussions of
this take place in the context of jurors and the questionable efficacy of limiting
instructions. See, e.g., Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving... But the Words
Aren't Clear: Dissecting the Presumption That Jurors Understand Instructions, 69
Mo. L. REv. 163, 212 (2004) (proposing that reviewing courts should take account
of the fact that "instructions have been misunderstood [by jurors] in significant
numbers," contrary to the presumption of juror understanding); Joel D. Lieberman
& Jamie Arndt, supra note 166, at 686 ("With few exceptions, empirical research
has repeatedly demonstrated that both types of limiting instructions are unsuccessful
at controlling jurors' cognitive processes.").
171. An approximation of the "for what it's worth" phrase is encountered in
the JAMS Rules. See JAMS Comprehensive Rule 22(d) ("The Arbitrator shall
consider evidence that he or she finds relevant and material to the dispute, giving the
evidence such weight as is appropriate."). However, the recurring use of the phrase
by numerous commentators makes it impossible to determine the original source of
the phrase, only that it is widely known and used throughout the arbitration
community.
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simply because it is admitted in arbitration, and many of the same
situations can arise within arbitration as within trials. Some FRE rules
are admittedly less likely to directly surface within arbitration. For
example, Rule 404 character evidence is primarily a concern in
criminal trials, although it is possible to make character evidence
objections within civil trials. 17 2 Nevertheless, certain character
evidence situations could in fact surface in arbitration, such as the past
conduct of an employee offered to show the employee's conduct on
the occasion in question. Some of the other FRE rules of exclusion
with primarily policy-based rationales, such as FRE 407, 408, and 411,
also have the potential to surface in arbitration, given the fact that
arbitrators--operating in the interest of efficient disposition of
disputes-may be privy to settlement talks and negotiations between
parties, due to the decreased formalities of arbitration or an individual
arbitrator's more managerial approach to arbitrating a dispute. There
is no basis to think that their knowledge of those discussions would
not trigger similar risks to the admission at trial of evidence of an offer
to compromise. Thus, some arbitrators already take account of 407-,
408-, and 411-type concerns and refuse to accept such evidence. 173
Arbitrators do have the power to exclude certain evidence
without being reversed. However, the nature of arbitration has led to
the widely held belief that arbitrators almost never exclude
evidence. 174 Discussing the refusal of arbitrators to receive evidence,
an American Law Reports article even concedes that "in effect, it is
assumed that the evidence should, or at least could, have been properly
received, with the courts determining whether the refusal to receive it
is fatal to the award." 175 However, the case law from the Supreme
Court. interpreting the FAA-specifically, the paucity of cases
affirmatively vacating arbitration awards for evidentiary failures-
suggests that vacatur based upon refusal to receive evidence is
172. See discussion infra Part I.
173. See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Scholarly and Institutional Challenges to the
Law of Evidence: From Bentham to the ADR Movement, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 837,
845-46 (1992) ("Many arbitrators refuse to admit evidence revealing pre-hearing
negotiations and offers of compromise in order to encourage parties to engage in
settlement discussions, thereby adopting the policy of Federal Rule 408.").
174. See Mary Jane Trapp, How to Prepare Your Case for the Arbitrator,
GPSOLO, Jan./Feb. 2015, at 36, 38 (noting "most everything offered is admitted");
see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 173, at 847 ("[E]vidence offered by parties,
provided it is relevant, should generally be received, with concerns regarding its
probative force going to weight rather than admissibility.").
175. Alan R. Gilbert, Refusal of Arbitrators to Receive Evidence, or Permit
Briefs or Arguments, on Particular Issues as Grounds for Relief from Award, 75
ALR.3d 132 (2015).
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something of a rare occurrence. Thus, from the outset, if arbitrators
were inclined to utilize their discretion more frequently to exclude
evidence, it seems they would be able to do so reasonably, and without
significant fear that their award will be vacated.1 6 This corresponds
to recent calls for judges in civil litigation to act in a similar fashion,
but during the discovery phase of litigation, pursuant to the newly
revised discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 177
Some have called for arbitrators to exercise their authority to
limit evidentiary presentations more frequently. Tracey Frisch, a
Senior Counsel at AAA, notes that "[a]rbitrators play a critical role in
asserting their authority to provide parties with a cost-effective and
expeditious arbitration," and therefore that "[n]o informed arbitrator
should shy away from their responsibility for fear of jeopardizing the
award., 178 Thus, exclusion of evidence is one of the areas where
arbitrators can exercise some discretion. However, others have argued
how the burgeoning of ADR-style dispute resolution techniques have
gone hand in hand with a liberalization of evidence philosophy, one
that shies away from an increasingly exclusionary arbitral role.1 79
There are a number of reasons to believe that arbitrators are
unlikely to significantly restrict evidentiary presentations. Arbitrations
are, first, inherently party-controlled means of dispute resolution. 8 0
Parties contract for a certain set of rules, many of which are, as
discussed, worded with wide latitude to admit evidence.1 8 1 Both for
fear of being vacated on appeal, and in hopes of giving parties the
benefit of their bargained-for contract, arbitrators are unlikely to begin
rigorously applying exclusionary doctrines. As a secondary matter,
absent a change to discovery in arbitration, the narrow bounds of
discovery are simply inconsistent with a narrow and structured regime
176. Tracey B. Frisch, Death by Discovery, Delay, and Disempowerment:
Legal Authority for Arbitrators to Provide A Cost-Effective and Expeditious
Process, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 156 (2015) ("Judicial review of
awards on the ground that arbitrators have refused to hear evidence is limited. Courts
have confirmed awards so long as the arbitrators' refusal to hear evidence or deny
discovery requests did not deprive the party of a fundamentally fair hearing.").
177. See, e.g., Radvany, supra note 2, 707-09, 708 n.10 (relating the
motivation behind the 2015 revisions to dissatisfaction with judges' enforcement of
discovery limitations among other things).
178. Tracey B. Frisch, Death by Discovery, Delay, and Disempowerment:
Legal Authority for Arbitrators to Provide A Cost-Effective and Expeditious
Process, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 178 (2015).
179. Kirkpatrick, supra note 173, at 852 (suggesting further that alternative
forums of dispute resolution are places "where rules of evidence are not even
formally recognized").
180. See Radvany, supra note 2.
181. See text supra Part II.
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of evidentiary admissibility; unless parties were able to conduct more
thorough and probing discovery, rigorous attention to evidentiary
admissibility would likely affect parties' ability to make their case,
which would again open the arbitrator up to vacatur.
C. Evidence Has a Role, Regardless of Admissibility
Despite the fact that arbitrators appear unlikely to begin
applying a more exclusionary, litigation-style regime of evidence, the
principles underlying the law of evidence should not be entirely
disregarded during arbitration, simply because rules for ultimate
admissibility have been relaxed. "[T]he chasm between an
adjudicatory system with strict principles of evidentiary exclusion and
a system where such principles go only to the weight of the evidence
is not as wide as is sometimes assumed."' 8 2 Many principles from
evidence law apply to certain procedural matters, such as limiting the
purpose of certain evidence, taking judicial notice, and the use of
presumptions.1 83 With regard to other doctrines such as hearsay, to the
degree that the principles underlying the FRE do not simply vanish in
a different forum, the weight that an arbitrator gives a piece of
evidence could potentially be affected by the underlying rationale of
exclusion because the underlying rules of exclusion "have a direct
bearing on questions of weight."' 
84
Making the arbitrator aware of such a rationale has potentially
significant implications. Admittedly, the policy of generally admitting
evidence may serve other important objectives of the arbitral process.
Arbitrators are likely to continue the practice of generally admitting
most evidence. Nonetheless, the arbitrator is still at risk of being
affected by seeing that evidence, and, as discussed, the standing
directive to the arbitrator to weigh evidence does not necessarily map
well to arbitrators consciously doing so in practice with each and every
piece of evidence. For example, a counsel who calls attention to
multiple levels of hearsay within certain evidence forces arbitrators to
consciously weigh the reliability of proffered pieces of evidence.18 5
182. Kirkpatrick, supra note 173, at 848.
183. See id., at 845 n.44 (discussing the arbitration procedures consistent with
the FRE).
184. Id., at 848.
185. See Edna Sussman, Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious
Psychological Influences and What You Can Do About Them, 24 AM. REv. INT'L
ARB. 487, 493 (2013) ("Reviewing preliminary conclusions of the case to see if the
outcome would differ if unreliable evidence admitted on that basis had not been
introduced may serve as a check by showing the arbitrators the extent to which such
pieces of evidence have influenced their thinking.").
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Legally trained arbitrators are often broadly familiar with the
principles of evidence, and therefore are at least able to appreciate that
a cognizable evidence-based argument about the weight of evidence
should, indeed, affect the weight they give that evidence.'1 86
Another reason counsel should take care to make certain
evidentiary arguments is that on panels of multiple arbitrators,
evidentiary decisions may be handled exclusively by a chairperson,
who does have the opportunity to vet evidence before showing it to
other members of the panel. This does not necessarily mean the single
arbitrator charged with evidentiary decisions is more likely to exclude
evidence, but it still raises the incentive for counsel to make evidence
arguments. If a counsel can make clear the unreliable nature of a piece
of evidence, there is a chance that only one out of multiple arbitrators
will be exposed to the evidence at all, decreasing the potential danger
of contamination.1 87
Finally, if arbitrators are more consistently apprised of
evidence-based reasons to weigh evidence, the results of arbitrations
could also become more predictable, and this would have other
beneficial outcomes. Knowledge that an arbitrator has been apprised
of FRE-based arguments about certain pieces of evidence and is likely
to weigh evidence accordingly would foster faster resolution of cases
by settlement. Attorneys capable of making evidentiary arguments in
arbitration are better able to determine the value of both favorable and
unfavorable evidence, articulate that value to an arbitrator, and be
certain of the outcome that an arbitrator may reach based upon that
evidence.
CONCLUSION
It is broadly true that most evidence proffered is likely to be
accepted in arbitration. However, it is still important for counsel and
arbitrators to appreciate evidence-based arguments in the context of
arbitration for a number of reasons. Evidence and discovery function
in different and inverted ways in civil litigation versus arbitration for
reasons of efficiency, cost, and ease of dispute resolution. This does
not, however, eliminate the underlying rationale of evidence law: to
186. See Michael Z. Green, No Strict Evidence Rules in Labor and Employment
Arbitration, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 533 (2009) (noting that arbitrators are
"expected to have the expertise and experience to properly evaluate the evidence and
to accord it the appropriate weight dependent upon the corroborating circumstances
surrounding it").
187. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing "Mental
Contamination").
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promote the resolution of disputes upon more, rather than less, reliable
evidence. 188
Therefore, although the interests of arbitration may be served
by narrow discovery and open evidentiary admissibility, arbitrators
should be made cognizant of evidentiary principles during arbitration.
This can often be done during a summation, but should only relate to
important pieces of evidence where, under the FRE, a judge would
likely have excluded the evidence. It can also be done during the
presentation of evidence by making a short spoken objection to
proffered evidence. This should be done somewhat sparingly as
arbitrators will lose patience if a party makes too many objections and
thereby unnecessarily interrupts his or her adversary's presentation of
evidence.
Failure to consider these principles can lead to situations where
arbitrators lend greater weight to questionable or unreliable evidence
by not taking the time to consciously "weigh" evidence properly. Use
of evidence law during arbitration by counsel would serve to force
arbitrators to do so. Thus, while an arbitrator may be able to admit
almost anything during an arbitration hearing, the principles of
evidence could nonetheless be used to inform how they should view
and weigh the evidence they admit. Overall, it is possible that greater
attention to the role evidentiary principles could play in arbitration
should produce beneficial outcomes, such as increasing the reliability
and predictability of arbitral outcomes. Although attorneys in
arbitration may not be able to prevent unfavorable evidence from
being admitted, the attorney able to place the proffered material into
the proper evidentiary context is better able to influence how, if at all,
that evidence will affect the arbitrator. As the rules of evidence hinge
on issues such as reliability, prejudice, first-hand knowledge, and
authentication, this paper suggests that making evidentiary arguments
in arbitration can promote the determination of cases based upon more
persuasive, rather than less persuasive evidence.
188. See Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1957,
1965 (2008) (arguing that since the 18th century, the central function of evidence
law has been "to secure the best available evidence"); see also Michael L. Seigel,
Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for A Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L.
REv. 893, 896 (1992); Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L.
REv. 227 (1988) (both modem proponents of the "best evidence"-oriented theory of
evidence law).
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